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:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
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:

VENUS ANN SHERARD,

:

De fendant/Appe11ant.

Case No. 890383-CA
Priority No. 2

:

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In criminal cases, the trial court's broad discretion in
conducting voir dire carries with it the minimal responsibility to
address biases defined by statute, grounds justifying for-cause
challenges.

Trial courts have also been exhorted to pay heed to

trial counsel's capacity to identify necessary voir dire questions.
The trial court omitted questions underlying challenges for cause
and other areas of legitimate concern identified by trial counsel.
The questions omitted by the trial court were necessary to an
adequate evaluation of the potential jurors in this case.
The jurors in this case were given a confusing choice of
two crimes that may not have been proved, according to the jurors'
possible resolution of the evidence.

Because the evidence is

susceptible to an interpretation justifying a lesser included
offense instruction, the jurors should have had the option of
convicting Ms. Sherard of that lesser included offense, rather than
the choice of convicting Ms. Sherard of one of the confusing
unproved offenses or acquitting her altogether.

An effort to marshal the evidence in the context of this
case demonstrates that the prosecution failed in its burden to
disprove self defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED IN ITS DUTY
TO CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE VOIR DIRE.
In response to Ms. Sherard's contentions that the voir dire
was inadequate because it failed to probe juror affiliations with
the victim's family, juror group affiliations, juror attitude toward
alcohol use and violence, and juror exposure to press coverage, the
State's arguments may be grouped as follows:

1) Ms. Sherard waived

objections to the inadequacy of the voir dire; and 2) the questions
omitted by the trial court were not factually significant to the
verdict in this case.

Appellee's brief at 23-29.

A. IN CRIMINAL CASES, TRIAL COURTS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONTENT
OF THE VOIR DIRES THEY CONDUCT.
As noted previously, adequate voir dire is essential to
fair trials, and is uniquely important in criminal cases where
liberty is at stake.

See Appellant's brief at 17-19 and

accompanying footnotes.

Hence, it is proper for this Court's

analysis to focus on the Rule of Criminal Procedure designed to
govern voir dire.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 allows trial courts to
conduct voir dire, to conduct voir dire with the assistance of trial
counsel, or to delegate the entire process to trial counsel.
rule states, in part, as follows:

- 2
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The

(b) The court may permit counsel or the
defendant to conduct the examination of the
prospective jurors or may itself conduct the
examination. In the latter event, the court may
permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the
examination by such further inquiry as it deems
proper, or may itself submit to the prospective
jurors additional questions requested by counsel
or the defendant.
(emphasis added).
Under this rule, when trial courts opt to conduct voir
dire, the trial courts are not even required by the rule to utilize
supplemental voir dire from trial counsel in criminal cases, whereas
in civil cases, trial courts and trial counsel always share
responsibility for the voir dire.1
The broad authority granted to trial courts by Rule 18
reflects the legitimate expectation that trial courts are able to
conduct a sufficient voir dire in criminal cases.

As a guide for

voir dire in criminal cases, the Rule sets forth the most elementary
biases that preclude juror service in every case, the grounds
supporting for-cause challenges.
18(e).

Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure

In addition to statutory definitions of bases for for-cause

1. Compare the trial court's and counsel's shared
responsibility for voir dire in civil cases:
The court may permit the parties or their
attorneys to conduct the examination of
prospective jurors or may itself conduct the
examination. In the latter event, the court
shall permit the parties or their attorneys to
supplement the examination by such further
inquiry as is material and proper or shall itself
submit to the prospective jurors such additional
questions of the parties or their attorneys as is
material and proper.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 47(a)(emphasis added).
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challenges, trial courts have been put on notice that trial
counsels' familiarity with the evidence to be presented should be
recognized as an asset to the process of formulating voir dire
questions.

State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 844-845 (Utah 1988).

In this case, the trial court chose to conduct voir dire,
although defense counsel requested the opportunity to conduct the
voir dire (R. 22, M.H. 19). 2 In addition to the statutory notice of
criteria for for-cause challenges, the trial court was made aware of
additional areas of concern for voir dire —

the trial court

apparently used at least some of trial counsel's two sets of
supplemental questions during the voir dire (T. 3-67).

The trial

court was reminded of the requests for supplemental questions when
defense counsel referred to them in objecting to the inadequacy of
the voir dire (T. 65-66).

Defense counsel not only made a blanket

objection to the absence of all requested questions (T. 65), but
also made an effort to summarize the specific questions omitted by
the trial court, indicating her belief that she had mentioned all of
the omitted questions, but asking aloud what other questions had
been omitted (T. 65-66).3

2. The State indicates that because defense counsel did not
renew the motion to conduct voir dire after the trial court denied
it without prejudice, "defendant has waived this issue for purposes
of appeal." Appellee's brief at 18. While Ms. Sherard has not
raised the denial of the motion to conduct voir dire as an issue on
appeal, it is noteworthy that under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure
18(b), the trial court must always decide whether the court or
counsel will conduct voir dire, regardless of any motion by counsel.
3. The State argues that the omitted voir dire questions
missing from trial counsel's litany are waived. Appellee's brief at
(footnote continues)
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After these comments and defense counsel's explanation that
Ms. Sherard's exercise of challenges was compromised by the failure
to ask the requested questions, the trial court did not ask any
additional questions (T. 66-67).4

(footnote 3 continued)
23-29. It appears that when counsel was specifying the trial
court's omissions, the specification was a mere formality, and that
trial counsel's real opportunity to obtain additional questions came
at the unrecorded bench conference (T. 40), after which the trial
court asked additional questions (T. 40-49). See State v. Suarez,
793 P.2d 934, 936 n. 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(bench conferences should
be recorded).
Even if the shortcomings of court-conducted voir dire were
properly attributed to defense counsel, but see Utah Rule of
Criminal Procedure 18(b), as a practical matter, trial counsel can
pester a judge only so many times without trying the court's and
jurors' patience beyond the limit. In requesting counsel-conducted
voir dire, in then submitting two separate written sets of voir dire
questions (which the trial court, by rule, did not have to use), in
objecting at the bench conference to the trial court's failure to
ask needed questions, in making a blanket objection to the absence
of the supplemental questions, and in making an explicit effort to
note every shortcoming in the trial court's voir dire, trial counsel
performed admirably, if not dangerously.
4. Compare Brobera v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198 (Utah Ct. App.
1989)(per curiam), a civil case, in which this Court declined to
address the propriety of the voir dire in these circumstances:
The record on appeal does not show how, in what
context, or even whether the written questions
were brought to the trial court's attention at
the time of voir dire of the potential jurors.
No objection to the failure to ask the allegedly
proffered questions was made on the record. No
mention was ever made by counsel at trial that
any further examination of the jury panel was
necessary. The proposed questions were never
discussed on the record and no proffer was made
that they were relevant or material. In fact, it
is not entirely clear from the partial transcript
that the trial court did not attempt to
accommodate plaintiff's request by some
alternately phrased inquiry. Furthermore, at the
conclusion of the voir dire examination,
appellant passed the jury for cause.
Id. at 201.
- 5
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When the trial court opted to conduct the voir dire in this
criminal case, the trial court shouldered the responsibility for the
content of the voir dire.

The trial court was given notice of areas

critical to the voir dire by the two sets of supplemental questions
presented by defense counsel, and was responsible to address the
valid concerns raised in those questions, and set forth in the
statutory grounds for challenges for cause.
B. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THIS VOIR DIRE.
1. The trial court should have inquired about juror relations with
Ruby Kelly's family members.
The State argues that there is no record indication that
Ruby Kelly's family posed a special concern at the time the case
came to trial several months after Ruby Kelly's death.

Appellee's

brief at 24-25. A review of the record in this case casts question
on the State's factual interpretations and assertions underlying
this argument.5

5. Compare Appellee's brief at 24,
In 1987, there were some concerns that if
defendant and the victim's family came into
direct contact, a confrontation might result
(R. 272 at 23-24, 29). But, even defense counsel
recognized that this concern was not great but
simply an emotional response to death (R. 272 at
29) .
(emphasis added), with M.H. 29, where defense counsel indicates that
if Venus is housed in Delta, Utah, with the Bonner family, those
threatening her safety would be unlikely to find and pursue her.
Compare Appellee's brief at 24,
Additionally, in 1987, there apparently was some
media coverage of defendant's case (R. 22).
However, there is no record support that any of
the parties or the court had these same concerns
in 1989, the date of trial.
(footnote continues)
- 6
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Even if the record did not reflect the unusual indications
in this case that the relations between the injured parties and the
jurors needed to be explored, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e)
indicates that juror relationships with injured parties is a crucial
concern to be addressed in every case.

(footnote 5 continued)
(emphasis added) with R. 98, 103, 160 (defense suggested voir dire
questions concerning press coverage, filed in 1989); T. 50-53 (juror
Donahue read about the case a week prior to voir dire); T. 62, 64
(juror Malmstrom excused for cause because of exposure to press
coverage).
Compare Appellee's brief in footnote 7 on page 24,
Defendant's assertion that the court threatened
to clear the courtroom of Ruby Kelly's relatives
does not bear scrutiny (Br. of App. at 21 n.13).
(emphasis added), with Appellant's brief at 21, footnote 13:
When Ruby Kelly's cousin, Vikki Salazar, was
testifying in a manner supporting Venus' self
defense, the trial court had to threaten to clear
the courtroom because people in the courtroom
were reacting inappropriately (T. 461).
(emphasis added). For additional discussion of the general
courtroom atmosphere, see T. 598 (prosecutor's argument focusing on
audience in courtroom and not specific to Ruby Kelly's family,
"Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, another important thing I'd like
you to remember is that you're here to do justice. There are a lot
of people in the audience here today. There's been quite a bit of
concern about this case. The emotions have been high, people are
very upset . . . " ) .
The State takes issue with the characterization of Juror
Martinez's statements to the court concerning his relations with
Ruby Kelly's family members as "spontaneous":
Further, defendant's assertion that a juror
"spontaneously" informed the court of his
relationship with the victim's brother is untrue
(Br. of App. 23). The court had asked all the
jurors previously if they knew the victim, Ruby
Kelly, or a witness, Vikki Salazar, [footnote 8
Vikki Salazar and Ruby Kelly were cousins
(T. 461)] and had received a negative response
(T. 16-19). Subsequently, while the court was
(footnote continues)
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(footnote 5 continued)
questioning other jurors in chambers, prospective
juror Martinez asked to speak to the court and,
in chambers, reversed his previous answer. He
informed the court that he was good friends with
Ruby Kelly's brothers and his wife was Vikki
Salazar's sister-in-law (T. 58).
Appellee's brief at 24-25. The entirety of Juror Martinez's
individual voir dire is as follows:
Judge Young: The bailiff has informed me,
Mr. Martinez, that when we took this recess that
you indicated to him you desired to talk to the
court because you think you may be familiar with
some of the parties in this case.
Mr. Martinez: Yes.
Judge Young: With whom do you think you are
familiar?
Mr. Martinez: I know two of the brothers of
the alleged victim.
Judge Young: You know the Kelly brothers?
Mr. Martinez: Anthony and Max Kelly.
Judge Young: Would your acquaintance with
Anthony and Max cause you for any reason to feel
you would not be fair and impartial in this case?
Mr. Martinez: I think so, sir.
Judge Young: How close is your acquaintance
with Anthony and Max?
Mr. Martinez: Real good friends.
Judge Young: Are they close to you in age?
Mr. Martinez: Yes, I think they're about in
their 30's or somewhere. I'm 38.
Judge Young: All right. Have you been
acquainted with them during much of your lifetime?
Mr. Martinez: Well, since I married my
wife. And that's been about four years.
Judge Young: Is your wife more closely
acquainted to the Kellys than you?
Mr. Martinez: Yes. Her sister in law knows
'em really good. Her sister-in-law is Vikki
Salazar. And I think her last name was Kelly too.
Judge Young: Thank you, Mr. Martinez. We
appreciate your letting us know. You may be
excused.
(T. 58-59).
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2. The trial court should have inquired further about juror group
affiliations, and attitudes toward alcohol and violence.
The State's primary argument concerning the scope of voir
dire concerning juror group affiliations, and attitudes toward
alcohol and violence is that the questions do not have a sufficient
nexus to the disputed issues in this case.

Appellee's brief at

25-28.
The purpose of the voir dire is not limited to probing
juror attitudes toward facts and issues in dispute in a given case.
Indeed, voir dire is designed to prevent the service of jurors whose
attitudes toward non-critical facts might prevent the jurors from
focusing fairly on relevant issues.

State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839

(Utah 1988).
Much like the question concerning juror relations with Ruby
Kelly's family members, questions concerning juror group
affiliations might have supported a challenge for cause in this case
involving rival gangs.
18(e)(4).

See Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure

The questions concerning juror attitudes toward alcohol

and violence do have sufficient factual connection to this case, and
would have informed the exercise of peremptory challenges.

Under

governing standards, the questions should have been asked.

State v.

Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1060 (Utah 1984).
The State contends that the trial court's asking the jurors
if they thought consumption of alcohol to be "morally wrong" "in all
cases and under all circumstances" was an adequate means of
assessing whether jurors would be offended by the alcohol-related

- 9
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facts in this case.

Conversely, the State argues that Ms. Sherard's

supplemental questions concerning group affiliations were not
sufficiently specific to evoke juror responses concerning gang
affiliations.

Appellee's brief at 26-27.

Successful voir dire

requires more subtlety than is reflected in the trial court's
question concerning alcohol use, such as that reflected in the
general group affiliation questions suggested by defense counsel.
See State v. Worthen. 765 P.2d 839, 844-845 (Utah 1988)(voir dire
questions must be crafted with care in order to evoke evidence of
latent biases).
It has never been Ms. Sherard's contention that "the court
did not inquire of the jurors as to their involvement in fist
fights."
24-26.

Appellee's brief at 28.

Compare Appellant's brief at

Rather, it is Ms. Sherard's contention that the scope of the

trial court's voir dire concerning violence was inadequate.

For

instance, despite the evidence that Ms. Sherard had physical fights
with at least four women on the night of Ruby Kelly's death, the
trial court never probed juror attitudes toward physical violence
between females, as suggested in supplemental voir dire question 28.
3. The trial court should have inquired further about juror exposure
to press coverage.
The State argues that there is no indication that press
coverage was a legitimate concern at the time this case was tried,
almost two years after the death of Ruby Kelly.

Appellee's brief at

28-29.

The concern about press coverage is clearly evidenced in

1987.

E.g. R. 24 and 29 (request for counsel-conducted voir dire

- 10 -

based in part on press coverage), T. 31-32 (trial court discussion
of press-generated rumors about the case).

The press coverage is

also mentioned in the original 1989 set of voir dire questions
(R. 98, 103), and in the amended set filed the day before trial
(R. 160).
The fact that Juror Malmstrom recalled the press coverage
of the case from 1987 is some indication that the remoteness of Ruby
Kelly's death to the trial does not dissipate the concern about the
press coverage of the case.

Juror Donahue had read two articles in

the week prior to the voir dire and could not remember which of the
facts he recalled applied to Ms. Sherard's case (T. 50-53).

Compare

Appellee's brief at 28-29 ("Juror Donahue, who was not sure if he
had read about defendant's case or another one, discussed the matter
in chambers and was not challenged for cause by defendant.").6
Given that the trial court asked the jurors if they had
been exposed to press coverage about "this case" when the jurors
knew nothing about this case other than Ms. Sherard's name, the
names of the expected witnesses, and that the case involved
homicide, it is fortuitous that any of the jurors were able to
discern what case the court was discussing in inquiring about press
coverage.

6. Juror Donahue's service on the jury is explained by his
answers to the voir dire questions, indicating an appreciation for
Ms. Sherard's difficult childhood (T. 50-53), and should not be
interpreted as an indication that Ms. Sherard was not concerned
about the press coverage in this case. See also T. 62, 64, where
Juror Malmstrom was removed for cause because of her exposure to the
press.

- 11 -

4. Ms, Sherard has demonstrated an abuse of discretion requiring a
new trial with an adequate voir dire.
"All that is necessary for a voir dire question to be
appropriate is that it allow 'defense counsel to exercise
his peremptory challenges more intelligently.'"
State v. Hall, 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 37, 38 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 150 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah 1990), quoting State v. Worthen,
765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 1988), quoting State v. Ball. 685 P.2d 1055,
1060 (Utah 1984).
Ms. Sherard has identified numerous appropriate questions
which the trial court failed to ask.

When the entire voir dire is

viewed as a whole, the absence of these key questions demonstrates
that the trial court abused its discretion in conducting voir dire.
Ms. Sherard is entitled to be tried before a jury that is selected
fairly, and reversal is therefore required.7

7. Ms. Sherard is aware of Utah cases in which the
prejudice arising from a deficient voir dire is evident from the
record. E.g. State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984)(voir dire
deficient concerning alcohol abstention; non-drinking juror sat on
jury panel); State v. Hall, 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert, denied, 150 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah 1990)(voir dire deficient
concerning relationships with county attorney's office; jury foreman
related to deputy county attorney).
However, such explicit proof of prejudice is rarely
available in cases in which the paucity of information about the
jurors is the issue. See Hornsby v. Corporation of the Presiding
Bishop, 758 P.2d 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(civil case reversed for
inadequate voir dire without any discussion of jurors who served in
case). See also State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah
1988)(discussing proof of truth of religious beliefs, relying on
article I section 7 of Utah Constitution and the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution, the court indicated
that saddling a defendant with proof of the unprovable would be "an
obvious unfairness of the most fundamental kind."); Peters v. Kiff,
407 U.S. 493, 504 (1972)(plurality opinion)(prejudice caused by
racist jury selection is presumed because prejudice is difficult to
prove, yet harm caused by racist jury selection is extensive and
pervasive).
- 12 -

II.
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED
THE JURORS ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE,
NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.
The State agrees that the first part of the Baker lesser
included offense test is met in this case —

the statutory elements

of negligent homicide qualify it as a lesser included offense of
second degree homicide.

Appellee's brief at 31.

A. THE EVIDENCE, VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO MS. SHERARD,
COULD SUPPORT ACQUITTING HER OF SECOND DEGREE HOMICIDE AND
CONVICTING HER OF NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.
The next part of the Baker test requires evaluating the
evidence in this case to determine if any reasonable view of the
evidence would support acquitting Ms. Sherard of second degree
homicide and convicting her of negligent homicide.

£d.

In

evaluating this aspect of the Baker test, this Court must view the
evidence and inferences to be drawn from the evidence in the light
most favorable to Ms. Sherard.

E.g. State v. Velarde. 734 P.2d 449,

451 (Utah 1986).
The State agrees that Ms. Sherard's statement to Detective
Mendez during the investigation of Ruby Kelly's death supports a
negligent homicide theory, but argues that Ms. Sherard's trial
testimony disavows her statement to Officer Mendez that she did not
know she had a knife in her hand when she was fighting with Ruby
Kelly.

Appellee's brief at 33. The trial prosecutor apparently did

not feel that Ms. Sherard had abandoned the theory that she did not
know she had a knife in her hand.

E.g. T. 585-586 ("Maybe she

didn't know what was cold and hard in her hand was a knife.11).

- 13 -

More

importantly, Ms. Sherard's assessment at trial that "common sense
says" she had a knife in her hand does not rule out the possibility
that some two years prior to trial during the altercation with Ruby
Kelly and the surrounding crowd, Venus did not know that what she
had been handed was a knife.

Other support for the negligent

homicide instruction is addressed at pages 39 through 41 of
Appellant's brief.
Viewing all evidence and inferences in favor of the
negligent homicide theory, the jury should have been allowed to
determine whether, during the events on the night of Ruby Kelly's
death, Venus failed to perceive the risk posed by the object she had
been handed.
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE THE NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE
INSTRUCTION IS PREJUDICIAL.
The real question before this Court on the lesser included
offense issue is the harmless error question.

Because the improper

denial of a lesser included offense instruction is a violation of
the constitutional right to due process, State v. Baker, 671 P.2d
152, 157 (Utah 1983), this Court must reverse the conviction unless
the error can be found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
1. The trial court should have given the jurors the option to
convict Ms. Sherard of the lesser included offense, rather than
forcing them to choose between acquittal and an unproven offense.
Most important to the proper resolution of the harmless
error question in this case is consideration of why lesser included
offenses are considered part of a defendant's right to due process:

- 14 -

"[I]t has long been recognized that [the
lesser included offense] can be beneficial to the
defendant because it affords the jury a less
drastic alternative than the choice between
conviction of the offense charged and acquittal.11
State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 1983)(brackets by the Baker
court), quoting Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633 (1980).

The

Baker court explained the dangers present when the jurors are left
without sufficient options from which to choose:
"True, if the prosecution has not established
beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the
offense charged, and if no lesser offense
instruction is offered, the jury must, as a
theoretical matter, return a verdict of
acquittal. But a defendant is entitled to a
lesser offense instruction — in this context or
any other — precisely because he should not be
exposed to the substantial risk that the jury's
practice will diverge from theory. Where one of
the elements of the offense charged remains in
doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of
some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its
doubts in favor of conviction."
Baker, 671 P.2d at 156-157, quoting Keeble v. United States. 412
U.S. 205, 212-213 (1973) (emphasis original).
The jurors in this case may have believed that Venus
Sherard's most accurate perceptions of her state of mind during the
fighting were articulated during the interview with Detective Mendez
on the day after the fighting, when Venus indicated that she did not
know that she had been handed a knife.

Her misidentification of the

person who handed her the knife when she spoke with Officer Mendez
supports the conclusion that Venus was not acting with full
awareness when she fought with Ruby Kelly.

The jurors heard a tape

recording of that interview, which has been certified as part of the
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appellate record and which this Court is encouraged to hear.

A

transcript of the interview appears in Appendix 4 to the opening
Appellant's brief.

If the jurors believed that Venus did not know

that she had a knife in her hand when she was fighting with Ruby
Kelly, and thus did not perceive the risk or intend to seriously
harm or kill Ruby Kelly, the jurors could not legally have convicted
Venus of second degree homicide or manslaughter.

Yet faced with the

tragic death of Ruby Kelly and the unusual circumstances of this
case, the jurors may have felt compelled to convict Ms. Sherard of
one of the available charges.
Because the trial court's denial of the negligent homicide
instruction deprived the jury of the opportunity to fairly
adjudicate the facts of this case, reversal is required.
2. Because the jurors may not have understood the second degree
homicide and manslaughter theories charged in this case, the second
degree homicide conviction does not support the inference that they
would have rejected the negligent homicide verdict.
The fact that the jurors convicted Ms. Sherard of second
degree homicide, rather than manslaughter, is not dispositive of the
harmless error question unless it is safe to assume that the jurors
understood the differences between second degree homicide and
manslaughter.

Cf. Brief of Appellee at 34 ("By convicting defendant

of the greater offense, the jury necessarily considered and rejected
defendant's argument that she acted with any lesser mental state
than that associated with second degree murder.11).

Such an

assumption is particularly unfounded in the circumstances of this
case.
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The jurors were instructed on all variations of second
degree homicide and all variations of manslaughter (R. 226, 228,
229, 230, 238), A copy of pertinent jury instructions are contained
in Appendix 1 to this brief, and the full set of jury instructions
is contained in the appendix to Appellee's brief.
During deliberations, the jurors apparently asked the trial
court the differences between second degree homicide and
manslaughter (R. 199). 8

Rather than directing the jurors to the

instructions differentiating between the various theories behind the
two charges, the trial court simply referred the jurors back to the
elements instructions 29 and 31. The trial court did not refer the
jurors to instruction 33, which contains language differentiating
between depraved indifference second degree homicide and reckless
manslaughter,9 and did not refer the jurors to instruction 41, which
explains how what might be a second degree homicide translates into

8. The fact that the jurors asked about the differences
between second degree homicide and manslaughter may demonstrate that
the jurors were not immediately committed to the second degree
homicide charge. The jurors were instructed to consider the second
degree homicide instruction first and consider the manslaughter
charge in the absence of a verdict of guilt on the second degree
homicide charge, although the instruction was permissive, rather
than mandatory (R. 225). The second degree homicide elements
instruction informed the jurors that if they found all of the
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, they "must find the defendant
guilty of the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second
Degree as charged in the Information." (R. 226).
9. In State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988), the
court canvassed the history of appellate court confusion over the
distinctions to be drawn between second degree homicide and
manslaughter, and concluded that jury must be instructed on the
primary distinction between depraved indifference second degree
homicide and reckless manslaughter, that the level of risk of death
is higher for second degree depraved indifference homicide. Id. at
258-264.
- 17 -

manslaughter in cases involving an extreme emotional disturbance,
and in cases involving an imperfect self-defense.

The trial court

did not direct the jurors to instruction 35, defining the various
levels of intent distinguishing the various theories of homicide and
manslaughter.
A copy of the jury question and the trial court's answer
are contained in Appendix 2 to this brief.

The transcript contains

no discussion of this occurrence.10
The jurors' possible misunderstanding of the differences
between manslaughter and second degree homicide is an additional
reason why the absence of the negligent homicide instruction should
not be considered harmless error.
III.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION.
Ms. Sherard recognizes this Court's requirement that
defendants raising insufficient evidence issues marshal the
10. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(m) governs the
procedure to be followed when jurors ask legal questions during
deliberations. It states,
After the jury has retired for deliberation,
if they desire to be informed on any point of law
arising in the cause, they shall inform the
officer in charge of them, who shall communicate
such request to the court. The court may then
direct that the jury be brought before the court
where, in the presence of the defendant and both
counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry
or advise the jury that no further instructions
shall be given. Such response shall be
recorded. The court may in its discretion
respond to the inquiry in writing without having
the jury brought before the court, in which case
the inquiry and the response thereto shall be
entered in the record.
- 18 -

evidence.
1990).

State v. Moore. 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 32 (Utah App.

With proper respect due to the role of the jury and with an

eye to this Court's formidable task of writing the facts for the
opinion in this case, see id., Ms. Sherard proffers Table 1 from her
opening brief as a marshalling of the evidence.

The table presents

the evidence with record citations in a manner that allows this
Court to see the key factual agreements and disputes which are the
basis of Ms. Sherard's position that the State failed in its burden
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of self-defense.

See

State v. Knoll. 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985)(discussing State's burden
to prove absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt);
State v. Ramsey, 782 P.2d 480 (Utah 1989)(conviction supported by
some evidence (uncorroborated hearsay statement); court reversed
conviction on ground of insufficient evidence).
Disregarding the first three questions in the table, which
relate to the jury function of resolving credibility (Bias?
Inconsistent statements?

Taking drugs or alcohol at party?), this

Court can see from the table that the vast majority of the evidence
supports Venus Sherard7s self-defense.

While one could snatch

segments of testimony of the witnesses and create a theory
supporting Ms. Sherard's conviction, one could not do so without
speculation, or in good conscience, given the melee of evidence in
this case.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse Ms. Sherard's conviction and
order this case dismissed.

At the very least, Ms. Sherard in

entitled to a new trial with a jury that is selected fairly and
instructed adequately.
Respectfully submitted this

Jy /^day of February,

1991.

^
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Jury Instructions on Second Degree Homicide
and Manslaughter

INSTRUCTION NO.
You may give consideration to all the possible verdicts,
but you should begin your deliberations by considering the offense
of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree.
Unless all of you agree to find

the defendant guilty of

the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, you
may consider
in

the

consider

order
any

concerning
them.

the other offenses upon which I have instructed you

The

in
of

the

which
those

the

offenses

defendant's

purpose

of

instructions

guilt

this

control your deliberation.

without
or

were

having

innocence

instruction

is

to

given.

You

may

reached

agreement

on

other

any

aid

and

not

of
to

INSTRUCTION NO.

£

7

Before you can convict the defendant, Venus Ann Sherard,
of the crime of Criminal Homicide

- Murder in the Second Degree,

as charged in the Information on file in this case, you roust find
from

all

of

the evidence

beyond

a reasonable

doubt, all of the

following elements of that offense:
1.
Lake

That on or about the 7th day of March, 1987, in Salt

County,

State

of

Utah,

the

defendant,

Venus

Ann

Sherard,

caused the death of Ruby Kelly; and
2.

That

intentionally
bodily
to

or

said

defendant

knowingly;

or

then
(b)

life;

evidencing

or

(c)

a depraved

knowingly

indifference

there

intending

injury to another, she committed

human

and

did

so:

to cause

(a)

serious

an act clearly dangerous

acting

under

circumstances

to human life, she engaged in

conduct which created a grave risk to death to another;
3.

That said defendant caused the death in an unlawful

manner and without justification.
If you are convinced of the truth of each and every one
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find

the defendant

guilty

of

the offense

of

Criminal

Homicide,

Murder in the Second Degree as charged in the Information.
If, on the other hand, you find that the State has failed
to prove any of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must find the defendant not guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO. _%fi
You are instructed that Manslaughter is a lesser included
offense of Criminal Homicide - Murder in the Second Degree.

Z f

INSTRUCTION NO.

Before you can convict the defendant, Venus Ann Sherard,
of

the

crime

of

Criminal

Homicide

-

Manslaughter,

a

lesser

included offense, you must find from all of the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of that offense.
1.
Lake

That on or about the 7th day of March, 1987, in Salt

County,

State

of

Utah,

the

defendant,

Venus

Ann

Sherard,

caused the death of Ruby Kelly; and
2.

That

recklessly; or

said

defendant

then

and

there

did

so:

(a)

(b) knowingly or intentionally, but was under the

influence of an extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a
reasonable

explanation

intentionally

reasonably

or

excuse;

believing

or

the

(c)

knowingly

circumstances

provided

or
a

legal justification or excuse for her conduct for which no legal
justification

or

excuse

existed

under

the

then

existing

circumstances;
3.

That said defendant

then and there caused the death

in an unlawful manner and without justification.
If you are convinced

of the truth of each and every one

of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find

the defendant

guilty

of the offense of Criminal Homicide -

Manslaughter, a lesser included offense.
If, on the other hand, you find that the State has failed
to prove any of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must find the defendant not guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO. 2 L ± T
If you
whether

or

find

not

from

to

the

convict

evidence
the

that

you

must

determine

defendant

of

the

crime

of

whether

the

influence

of

Manslaughter, you are instructed

that in considering

defendant

another

caused

the

death

of

under

the

extreme emotional disturbance, such an emotional disturbance does
not include a condition resulting from mental illness.
The "extreme emotional disturbance" must be triggered by
something

external

from

the

accused,

and

her

reaction

to

such

external stimulus must be reasonable, and the terms must be given
the

meaning

you

would

give

them

in common

everyday

use.

Such

disturbance, therefore, cannot have been brought about by her own
peculiar

mental

processes

or by her own knowing

or

intentional

involvement in another crime.
The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse mitigates
a death

caused

by the defendant

under

the

influence

of extreme

emotional disturbance or the reasonableness of the belief that a
legal justification or excuse exists for legally unjustifiable or
excusable

conduct

is to be determined

from

the view point of a

reasonable person under the then existing circumstances.

INSTRUCTION NO.
The
callousness
total
highly

term
toward

indifference

indif f erence11

"depraved
the

value

^>2>
means

of

human

life and

as to whether

one!s

conduct

an

a complete
will

create

utter
and
the

likely probability that death will result from a risk that

the defendant knowingly creates.
More
to convict

than

recklessness

the defendant

under

is required, but rather in order
this mental

Murder in the Second Degree, you must find
acted knowingly,
the defendant

to

of death, and

constitute

(1) that the defendant

(2) in creating a grave risk of death,

knew the risk was grave,

likely probability

state

(3) that

(4) which means a highly

(5) that the conduct evidenced

an utter callousness and indifference toward human life.

INSTRUCTION NO.

3^~~

You are instructed that a person engaged in conduct:
(1)

Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of her conduct or to a result of her conduct, when
it is her conscious objective or desire
to engage in the conduct or cause the result.

(2)

Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to her conduct or to circumstances
surrounding her conduct when she is aware
of the nature of her conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a
result of her conduct when she is aware
that her conduct is reasonably certain to
cause the result.

(3)

Recklessly...with respect to circumstances surrounding her conduct or the result
of his conduct when she is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
exist or the result will occur. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that
its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an
ordinary person would exercise under all
the
circumstances as viewed
from the
actor1s standpoint.

INSTRUCTION NO.

When a homicide which would otherwise be murder in the
second degree is committed under the influence of an extreme
emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or
excuse then the offense constitutes manslaughter.
Likewise when a homicide which would otherwise be murder in
the second degree is committed when the defendant reasonably
believed the circumstances provided a legal justification which did
not exist then the offense constitutes Manslaughter.

Jury Question and Court7s Response
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